



Espinoza v. Farah Manufacturing Co., 414 U.S. 86 (1973). 
In an action by a Mexican alien, following exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), the plaintiff alleged that Farah Manufacturing Company 
had refused to hire her because of her Mexican citizenship. It was argued 
that this refusal constituted a violation of Section 703 of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 The district court granted plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment2 relying primarily on an EEOC guideline which 
provides that a lawful alien resident may not be discriminated against 
on the basis of citizenship.3 The court of appeals reversed, 4 and the 
Supreme Court affirmed. 
In holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 does not extend to 
discrimination based on alienage, the Supreme Court considered the 
history of the statute in construing the intent of its drafters. The Court 
noted that while the original draft included a bar against discrimination 
based on "ancestry," this classification was deleted prior to the bill's 
passage. Moreover, since 1914, the Government itself has, through Civil 
Service Commission regulations, engaged in discrimination against al-
iens by denying them the right to enter competitive examinations for 
federal employment. To further stress the fact that this citizenship re-
quirement for federal employment does not constitute discrimination 
based on national origin, the Court stated: 
To interpret the term "national origin" to embrace citizenship require-
ments would require us to conclude that Congress itself has repeatedly 
flouted its own declaration of policy. This Court cannot lightly find 
such a breach of faith. So far as federal employment is concerned, we 
think it plain that Congress has assumed that the ban on national-
origin discrimination in § 701(b) did not effect the historical practice 
of requiring citizenship as a condition of employment.5 
* Prepared by Peter A. Bieger, Milton Steven Blaut, David F. Everett, and Sue Meris 
Novick. 
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 20000e-2(a) (1971) states: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin . 
2. 343 F. Supp. 1205 (W.D. Tex. 1971). 
3. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.l(d) (1972). 
4. 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972). 
5. 414 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted). 
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While the Court declared that the statute does not reach discrimi-
nation based on alienage or citizenship in general, it did qualify its 
statement so as to bar di·scrimination between aliens because of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Thus, to hire aliens of Anglo-
Saxon background, but to refuse to hire aliens of Mexican or Spanish 
ancestry, would constitute discrimination in violation of the statute. 
Nonetheless, the significant point of the Espinoza decision, in the words 
of the Court, is that" ... nothing in the Act makes it illegal to discrimi-
nate on the basis of citizenship or alienage."6 
Jury Duty 
Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134 (D. Md. 1974). 
Plaintiff, a resident alien, initiated a class action challenging the 
constitutionality of federal and state statutes which barred him, solely 
on the basis of alienage, from serving on grand and petit jury panels in 
federal and state courts.7 The plaintiff argued that statutes imposing a 
citizenship requirement for jurors deny him, and others similarly situ-
ated, equal protection of the law as guaranteed by the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution. The plaintiff further contended 
that no compelling state or federal interest justifies the disqualification 
of aliens, as a class, from jury service. In support of his position, the 
plaintiff cited cases extending constitutional protection to aliens in the 
area of economic rights. 8 
The court stated that both state and federal governments have a 
compelling interest in assuring that, under our system of justice, those 
who make the ultimate factual decisions on questions involving personal 
liberty and property rights be either native born or naturalized citizens. 
The court also noted that it may be fairly concluded that, as a class, 
citizens are more likely to make informed or just decisions in such mat-
ters than are non-citizens. Moreover, the court asserted that the state's 
obligation to "preserve the basic conception of a political community"9 
applies to grand and petit jurors in both state and federal courts because 
they are persons holding important nonelective judicial positions, who 
participate directly in the execution of the laws and "perform functions 
that go to the heart of representative government. " 10 Therefore, the state 
has a compelling interest in the restriction of jury service to those who 
will be loyal to, interested in, and familiar with, the customs of this 
6. Id. at 95. 
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1970) and Mn. CODE ANN. art. 51, § 1 (1972). 
8. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
9. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972). 
10. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973). 
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country. The court concluded that service on juries is the prime example 
of an instance where "'citizenship bears some rational relationship to 
the special demands of the particular position.' " 11 This has been explic-
itly recognized, by dictum if not by holding, in several Supreme Court 
cases which have dealt with juror qualifications under the fourteenth 
amendment. 12 
Jury service may, therefore, appropriately be limited to citizen 
members of the political community. 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Judicial Notice 
Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 
N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974). 
In two separate actions against an airline to recover for psychic 
trauma and bodily injuries suffered by passengers on a hijacked aircraft, 
the plaintiffs moved for summary judgments against the defendant on 
the issue of liability. Under the Convention for the Unification of Cer-
tain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air13 (the War-
saw Convention)-the official version of which is in French-the defen-
dant's liability is absolute when the facts establish an injury as defined 
by article 17. 14 The respective trial courts granted the motions, 15 holding 
that no triable issue of fact had been presented by the airline on the 
issue of liability, and the First and Second Departments of the Appel-
late Division reversed. 16 The reversals were predicated on findings that 
the courts could not take judicial notice of the meaning of a foreign 
language; thus, triable issues of fact were presented as to the precise 
meaning of the French text of article 17. The plaintiffs appealed. 
Consolidating the two actions for a hearing, the New York Court of 
Appeals overruled the appe1late division, and stated: 
While the treaty is written in French, it is nevertheless a domestic, not 
a foreign law. It is the supreme law of the land (U.S. Const., Art. VI, 
11. Dougall v. Sugarman, 339 F. Supp. 906, 911 (1973) (Lumbard, J., concurring). 
12. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U.S. 291 (1891) ; 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
13. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, June 27, 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876. 
14. The English translation of article 17, which follows, is found at 49 Stat. 3018: 
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or 
wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger, if 
the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking. 
15. 69 Misc. 2d 642, 330 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1972). 
16. 40 App. Div. 2d 850, 337 N.Y.S.2d 827 (2d Dep't 1972) and 40 App. Div. 2d 963, 
338 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1st Dep't 1972). 
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cl. 2) of which New York courts are required to take judicial notice 
(CPLR 4511, subd. [a]). The "precise meaning" of the terms of the 
Convention, therefore, is to be determined by the court as a question 
of law (CPLR 4511, subd. [c]) and cannot be treated as a triable issue 
of fact so as to defeat consideration of a motion for summary judg-
ment.17 
In resolving the question of the meaning to be ascribed to the 
French words in article 17, the New York Court of Appeals decided that, 
where there is no dispute over the proper translation of the terms in 
controversy, and where, historically, parties to the Warsaw Convention 
have not considered themselves to be bound to the application of French 
law when dealing with questions arising under the Convention, it is not 
necessary to look to the internal law of France to determine the scope 
and meaning of the terms of article 17. The court distinguished Block 
v. Compagnie Nationale, 18 in which the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit said: "[t]he binding meaning of the terms [of the 
Warsaw Convention] is the French legal meaning." Block applies to the 
act of translation from French into English. For the purposes of the 
present dispute, an accurate English translation already exists and may 
be found appended to the Convention in the United States Statutes at 
Large. 19 
The language of article 17 must be interpreted "according to its 
ordinary and natural meaning"20 and given effect so as to uphold the 
underlying purposes of the Convention. An examination of the intent of 
the parties to the Warsaw Convention indicates that it was designed to 
promote uniformity between the signatories as to the laws applied to air 
carriers. Specifically, the provisions creating liability were designed to 
protect air carriers from excessive claims21 and, as a counter-balance, to 
provide claimants with some definite basis for recovery. 22 
Applying this standard, the New York Court of Appeals determined 
that where there is a causal connection between the accident and some 
palpable physical injury, the claim for damages can be allowed. Psychic 
trauma may serve as a causal link between the event and the injury, but 
cannot by itself be regarded as a "bodily injury" for which recovery may 
be had. Once a causal link has been established between the event and 
any physical injury, however, any damages, such as mental suffering, 
which flow from such physical injury are compensable. 
17. 34 N.Y.2d at 392, 314 N.E.2d at 852, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 103. 
18. 386 F.2d 323, 330 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1967). 
19. 49 Stat. 3014 et seq. 
20. 34 N.Y.2d at 396, 314 N.E.2d at 855, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
21. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 53, 59, 203 N.E.2d 640, 641, 255 N.Y.S.2d 
249, 251 (1964). 
22. 34 N.Y.2d at 395, 314 N.E.2d at 854, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 106. 
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Jurisdiction 
Holden v. Commonwealth of Australia, 369 F. Supp. 1258 (N.D. Cal. 
1974). 
An action was brought against the Commonwealth of Australia, the 
United States, and certain individuals for injuries allegedly suffered as 
a result of a collision between an automobile in which the plaintiff was 
riding and an automobile owned by the United States. Process was 
served on the Consul General for the Commonwealth of Australia in San 
Francisco. The Commonwealth of Australia moved to dismiss the action 
for lack of personal jurisdiction. The issue before the district court was 
whether service of a complaint on a foreign consul was sufficient to 
obtain jurisdiction over the "person" of the country he represents. 
The court dismissed the complaint as to the Commonwealth of 
Australia, stating that it was settled that, with at least one exception, 23 
a consul is not the agent of the country he represents for the purpose of 
receiving service of process. 24 
COMMERCE 
Arbitration 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
Alberto-Culver, a U.S. corporation, agreed to purchase from Fritz 
Scherk, a German citizen, three companies located in Germany. The 
contract, negotiated in the United States, Great Britain and Germany, 
signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland, contained several express 
trademark warranties and an arbitration clause providing that: 
'[a]ny controversy or claim [that] shall arise out of this agreement 
or the breach thereof would be referred to arbitration before the Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, and that '[t]he laws 
of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply to and govern this agree-
ment, its interpretation and performance.25 
Nearly one year after the contract closing, Alberto-Culver discov-
ered that the trademark rights purchased from Scherk were subject to 
substantial encumbrances. The company then commenced an action 
for relief in a federal district court in Illinois contending that Scherk's 
23. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1966), where 
the Second Circuit concluded: "This is not to say that service on the sovereign may be 
effected on any representative of the sovereign." Rather, the court held that, "service on 
the branch which is a party to the contract sued upon is sufficient." 360 F.2d at 110. In 
Petrol Shipping Corp., the branch of the sovereign, service on which was upheld as being 
valid, was the foreign sovereign's New York ministry of commerce, a party to the contract 
in question. 
24. Purdy Co. v. Argentina, 333 F.2d 95 (7th Cir. 1964). 
25. 417 U.S. at 508 (footnote omitted). 
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fraudulent representations violated the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.26 
Scherk filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the district 
court lacked personal and subject-matter jurisdiction on the basis of 
forum non conveniens, and that the arbitration clause dictated that the 
International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France, be the situs of the 
suit. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals27 
denied the motion. 
The Supreme Court reversed, and emphasized that where a U.S. 
company negotiates a contract in Europe and America as to the pur-
chase of European business entities, involving commerce with a foreign 
country, the value agreement providing for arbitration of disputes is 
covered by the Arbitration Act of 1925.28 This Act provides that an 
arbitration agreement is valid, irrevocable and enforceable, unless there 
are grounds in law or equity for the revocation of the contract. 29 The Act 
also directs federal courts to order the parties to a contract to proceed 
to arbitration if there has been a failure, refusal or neglect of any party 
to follow the arbitration agreement. 30 
The Court distinguished Wilko v. Sivan31 which held that arbitra-
tion clauses ordinarily permitted in contracts are not to be applicable 
to disputes brought under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.32 
Wilko was further distinguished as being a purely domestic agreement 
involving no international business entities whereas the Scherk contract 
concerned the sale of business enterprises organized primarily under the 
laws of European countries. In Wilko, the Court noted that "[ w]hen 
the security buyer, prior to any violation of the Securities Act, waives 
his right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in 
other business transactions."33 In a buyer waiver situation, the security 
26. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1970). 
27. 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973). 
28. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). 
29. Id. § 2. 
30. Id. § 4; see also id. § 3, providing: 
If any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States 
upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such 
arbitration, the court in which such suit is pending, upon being satisfied that 
the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration under 
such an agreement, shall on application of one of the parties stay the trial of 
the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms 
of the agreement, providing the applicant for the stay is not in default in pro-
ceeding with such arbitration. 
31. 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 
32. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970), which provided a defrauded purchaser with the "special 
right" of a private remedy for civil liability. 
33. 346 U.S. at 435. 
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seller has a greater choice of venue. But a party to an international 
contract may resort to a foreign court to hinder access to an American 
court. 
The Court noted that in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 34 it re-
jected the doctrine that a contract's forum-selection clause would only 
be respected in an action brought in the United States, when the forum 
specified in the contract provided a more convenient forum than the 
state where the action is brought. In Zapata, the Court held that a 
"forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it should be 
set aside, " 35 the reason being that inconvenience to the parties may 
result if a suit could be brought in any jurisdiction in which an injury 
occurred and that the "elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing 
in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensible 
element in international trade, commerce, and contracting."36 
Consequently, the Scherk Court held that the provisions of the 
Arbitration Act cannot be ignored. Accordingly, under the facts pre-
sented in Scherk, an arbitration clause must be enforced with respect 
to a U.S. company's claims for damages and other relief for a seller's 
fraudulent representations concerning transferred trademarks in viola-
tion of the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
Therefore, an arbitration agreement which specifies the tribunal which 
is to adjudicate disputes is a specialized forum-selection clause "that 
posits not only the situs of the suit but also the procedure to be used in 
resolving the dispute. " 37 The Court concluded by stating that not all 
disputes must be resolved under American laws in a world of interna-
tional trade and commerce. 
National Labor Relations Board 
Windward Shipping (London) Ltd. v. American Radio Association, 
AFL-CIO, 415 U.S. 104 (1974). 
The owners of two foreign vessels, 38 composed entirely of foreign 
crewmen, sought injunctive relief in the Texas courts to prevent the 
picketing of their ships by several unions. 39 The trial court denied relief, 
34. 407 U.S. 1 (1973). 
35. Id. at 15. 
36. Id. at 13-14. 
37. 417 U.S. at 519 (footnote omitted). The Court also stated that under some cir-
cumstances, arbitration designated to take place at a specified situs may also be viewed 
as selecting the law of that situs to apply to the transaction in question. 
38. Both ships were owned by Liberians and registered in Liberia, the Northwind by 
Westwind Africa Line Ltd., and the Theomana by the SPS Bulkcarriers Corporation and 
managed by Windward Shipping (London) Ltd., a British corporation. 
39. Four picketers were assigned to each vessel carrying the following signs: 
Attention to the Public the wages and benefits paid seamen aboard the vessels 
THEOMANA (NORTHWIND) are substandard to those of American seamen. 
This results in extreme damage to our wage standards and loss to our jobs. 
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finding that the activities "affected commerce" under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 40 and therefore were within the jurisdiction of the 
National Labor Relations Board and not that of the Texas courts. 41 The 
Texas Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, 42 and the plaintiff appealed. 
The Supreme Court decided that the unions' activities, which were 
solely designed to force the foreign vessels to raise their operating costs 
to levels comparable to U.S. shippers, were not "affecting commerce" 
under the Act, and that the Act did not prohibit the Texas courts from 
entertaining an injunction suit. The picketing activities, according to 
the Court, did not involve an intrusion in the foreign vessels' affairs. The 
pickets were not engaged in a dispute as to unionization complaining 
that non-unionized American labor should be hired. Nor were the unions 
protesting wages paid to American workers. The Court noted that these 
activities would "affect commerce," and that Congress, when it used the 
words "in commerce" in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 
(LMRA), did not desire that the Act should eliminate the principles of 
comity and accommodation in international maritime trade. 43 
In concerning itself with the situation of foreign vessels, the Court 
stated: 
A decision [by foreign owners] to boycott American ports in order to 
avoid the difficulties induced by the picketing would be detrimental 
not only to the private balance sheets of the foreign shipowners but to 
the citizenry of a country as dependent on goods carried in foreign 
bottoms as is ours. 44 
Moreover, the Court warned that the respondents' picketing might in-
Please do not patronize this vessel. Help the American seamen. We have no 
dispute with any other vessel on this site. 
40. National Labor Relations Act, § 2(6), (7), 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(6), (7) (1970) pro-
vides: 
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or 
communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia 
or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or be-
tween any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, 
or within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the 
same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of 
Columbia or any foreign country. 
(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or ob-
structing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to 
lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of 
commerce. 
41. The trial court found that the conduct met the test of San Diego Bldg. Trades 
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S . 236 (1959). 
42. 482 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
43. 415 U.S. at 112-13. See Lauritzen v. Larson, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
44. 415 U.S. at 114. 
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duce retaliatory action against the U.S. vessels in foreign ports. 45 
In arriving at its decision the Court distinguished Benz v. Cam-
pania. Naviera Hidalgo 46 and International Longshoremen's Local 1416 
v. Ariadne Shipping Co. 47 The issue in Benz was whether the LMRA 
precluded a diversity suit for damages brought in a district court by 
foreign shipowners against several picketing AmeriCan unions who sup-
ported sti:iking foreign crews employed by foreign owners. The Court 
decided that the LMRA did not pre-empt the shipowners' action and 
that the Act was not intended to govern disputes between foreign crews 
and owners, domestic labor law should not become involved in foreign 
trade absent a congressional mandate allowing such an intrusion. 48 
In the Ariadne decision, the Court noted that only the picketing of 
foreign ships in protest of substandard wages paid by foreign owners to 
non-union American longshoremen was "in 'commerce' within the 
meaning of§ 2(6), and thus might have been subject to the regulatory 
power of the National Labor Relations Board," since the dispute "cen-
tered on wages to be paid American residents." 49 
Therefore, the Court in Windward Shipping stated that this case 
falls under the Benz holding rather than Ariadne50 and that the respon-
dents' activities cannot force the foreign vessels to raise their operating 
costs to American shippers' levels since this would have a detrimental 
effect on the foreign vessels' maritime operations. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Banking 
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974) . 
Several California banks, depositors, the bankers' association, and 
the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.) brought an action to 
enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury and heads of other federal agencies 
from enforcing the regulations of the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970.51 Con-
gress passed this Act to ensure the availability of foreign and domestic 
bank records of customers thought to be violating criminal, tax, and 
other regulatory laws. Title I of the Act requires financial institutions 
to maintain records of their customers' identities, to make microfilm 
copies of checks and similar instruments and to keep records of certain 
45. Id. 
46 353 U.S. 138 (1957). 
47. 397 U.S. 195 (1970). 
48. See Incres Steamship Co. v. International Maritime Workers Union, 372 U.S. 24 
(1963); McCullock v. Sociedad Nacional, 372 U.S. 10 (1963). 
49. 397 U.S. at 199-200. 
50. 415 U.S. at 115. 
51. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1829b (Supp. 1975) and 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1122 (Supp. 1975). 
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other items, 52 while Title II of the Act requires the reporting to the 
Government of certain foreign and domestic transactions. 53 The three-
judge district court upheld the reporting and recordkeeping provisions 
of the Act but concluded that the domestic reporting provision was 
invalid on its face and under the fourth amendment and enjoined its 
enforcement. 54 
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary's regulations 
requiring recordkeeping did not deprive banks of due process. The plain-
tiffs' claims must be weighed against the purpose of the Act which was 
to aid the Government in preventing organized crime, to establish an 
equitable administration of taxes, and to assist the enforcement of other 
regulatory laws. 
According to the Court the maintenance of records by the banks, 
as compelled by the regulations, did not constitute a seizure. The keep-
ing of records, the Court noted, is standard practice for many banks and 
the costs are not unreasonable. No violation of the due process clause 
of the seventh amendment was found, since the Government had not 
sought disclosure of the bankers association membership or contribu-
tors. Moreover, the deposition rights were deemed protected, and there 
was no violation of the fifth amendment, since the requisition of records 
can only be accomplished through existing legal process. 
The plaintiffs also raised a fourth amendment challenge to the 
foreign reporting requirements. 55 The plaintiffs contended that Con-
gress, in exercising its plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce, 
had delegated significant portions of this regulatory power to the Execu-
tive. When both the Congress and the Secretary of the Treasury exercise 
their authority to require reporting of previously described foreign finan-
cial transactions, plaintiffs' rights were abridged. The Court determined 
that since a statute requiring the filing and subsequent publication of a 
corporate tax return has been upheld against fourth amendment chal-
lenges, 56 the reporting requirements under the Act are not per se viola-
tions of the fourth amendment. The Court emphasized the nation's 60 
year history of self-assessment of individual and corporate income taxes 
and the importance of the self-regulatory aspects of that system. The 
reporting requirements of the Act and the settled practice of the tax 
collection process were deemed similar. 
Boyd v. United States57 was cited by the Court as holding that the 
fourth amendment does not prohibit all requirements that information 
52. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1829b(c), (d) (Supp. 1975). 
53. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1122 (Supp. 1975) . 
54. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972). 
55. 416 U.S. at 59. 
56. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 174-76 (1911). 
57. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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be made available to the Government: 
[T)he supervision authorized to be exercised by officers of the revenue 
over the manufacture or custody of excisable articles, and the entries 
thereof in books required by law to be kept for their inspection, are 
necessarily excepted out of the category of unreasonable searches and 
seizures. 58 
The Court concluded by emphasizing that the Secretary's regula-
tions did not authorize indiscriminate rummaging among the records of 
the plaintiffs; foreign financial reports required by the regulations must 
include information as to a limited group of financial transactions in 
foreign commerce and are reasonably related to the statutory purpose 
of assisting the enforcement of U.S. laws. Therefore, the plenary author-
ity of Congress over foreign commerce is not open to dispute. Congress 
is not limited to any one approach in effectuating its concern that nego-
tiable instruments moving in commerce are aiding a criminal enter-
prise.59 
Foreign Judgments 
British Midland Airways Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 
869 (9th Cir. 1974). 
An action was brought by a British corporation to enforce a judg-
ment obtained against an American corporation in the High Court of 
Justice in England. 
The appellee, British Midland Airways (BMA) was a corporation 
organized under the laws of the United Kingdom, and the appellant, 
International Travel, Inc., was incorporated in Washington. The parties 
had entered into a contract regarding charter flights from the United 
States and Canada to England. The contract contained a clause which 
stated that the parties agreed to be governed by the laws of England and 
to submit any dispute arising from the contract to the High Court of 
Justice in England. Subsequent to the signing of the contract, a dispute 
occurred and BMA initiated an action in the British courts against 
International Travel for breach of contract. 
Pursuant to a judgment for BMA, the plaintiff brought an action 
in U.S. district court to enforce the decision. The district court found 
the British judgment to be valid and enforceable. On appeal the defen-
dant based its opposition to the judgment for BMA on principles of 
comity. It contended that the British courts denied due process by re-
quiring that there be a deposit as a prerequisite to defending the lawsuit 
and holding International Travel in default for failing to comply with 
58. Id. at 623-24. 
59. 416 U.S. at 46. 
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that order, and by not recording the proceeding and not allowing proof 
of damages to be submitted. 
In affirming the judgment for the plaintiff the court noted that it 
was "unnecessary to decide BMA's contention that any foreign judg-
ment is conclusive under Washington law unless the foreign court ex-
ceeded its jurisdiction."60 Moreover, the court stated that U.S. courts 
have inherited major portions of judicial procedure and tradition from 
Britain, and that the Queen's Bench should not be considered a "kanga-
roo court." It was held that the British court afforded the defendant a 
sufficient opportunity to present affidavits and argue its case, and that 
International Travel did not pursue the matter on appeal. 61 The court 
also stressed that the defendant agreed to be bound by British law and 
that a U.S. court should not disturb such a choice. 
Therefore, the court echoed the holding by the Supreme Court in 
Hilton v. Guyot, 62 that it has been long established that unless the 
judgments of a foreign country are the result of outrageous departures 
from civilized notions of jurisprudence, comity should not be refused. 
Import-Export Clause 
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974). 
In an action by the Ohio State Tax Commissioner to recover unpaid 
ad valorem personal property taxes from the National Cash Register 
Company, the defendant argued that the taxes were improperly assessed 
against goods which were immune from local taxation under the import-
export clause of the Constitution. 63 The items in controversy were cer-
tain machines manufactured by the defendant to the specifications of 
foreign buyers, and stored in an Ohio warehouse awaiting shipment. As 
designed, the items were not suited for use inside the United States. 
The Ohio State Board of Tax Appeals upheld the levy; the defen-
60. 497 F.2d at 871 (footnote omitted). The Court cited Somportex Ltd. v. Philadel-
phia Chewing Gum Corp. , 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied , 405 U.S. 1017 (1972) 
which held that English procedure comports with American standards of due process. In 
Somportex, the plaintiff brought an action to enforce a default judgment obtained in 
England. The U.S. District Court of Pennsylvania entered summary judgment for the 
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. Since the British court's judgment, and not the 
underlying contract upon which suit had been brought in England, was at issue, the court 
dismissed the complaint affirming the British court's discretion. 
61. 497 F.2d at 871. 
62. 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895). 
63. The Import-Export Clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 10, cl. 2, provides: 
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties 
on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing 
it's Inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any 
State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United 
States, and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the 
Congress. 
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dant appealed and the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. 64 The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted continuance. 
In its decision the Supreme Court of Ohio relied on the evidence 
submitted to find that, since the class of items in question were unique 
in design, unsalable in the United States, and had always been exported 
and never returned, a "certainty of export" existed in respect to the 
specific items in controversy. Because of that certainty, the Ohio court 
decided that the question of whether or not the machines had begun 
their journey to a foreign country was irrelevant. 65 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Justice Stewart, 
determined that the Supreme Court of Ohio had misconstrued the pur-
pose and thrust of the import-export clause. The Court relied on Coe v. 
Errol, 66 the first case to deal with this issue. The Court reaffirmed that 
the intent of the owner of the goods had no relevance to the key question 
of when "State jurisdiction over the commodities of commerce begins 
and ends."67 Coe established that a state's jurisdiction over goods con-
tinues "until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier 
for transportation to another State, or have been started upon such 
transportation in a continuous route or journey. " 68 
Since Coe, the question before the courts has been the factual one 
of determing "whether a sufficient commencement of the process of 
exportation has occurred so as to immunize the article at issue from 
state taxation."89 In Empresa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 70 a ce-
ment plant had been purchased by a Colombian company and was being 
dismantled for shipment to Colombia. After 12 percent of the plant had 
been shipped, Merced County levied a tax on the remaining 88 percent, 
some of which was crated and ready for shipment. The Supreme Court 
upheld the tax, deciding that the188 percent of the plant remaining in 
Merced County had not yet begun the process of exportation. 
Comparing the present case to Empresa, Justice Stewart stated 
that: "Title and possession were in NCR, payment had not yet been 
made by the putative purchasers, no export license had issued, and the 
machines were in the complete control of the respondent."71 Thus, it 
cannot be said that, in light of Empresa and Coe, the machines had 
become exports; they were still subject to state taxation. 
64. National Cash Register Co. v. Kosydar, 35 Ohio St. 2d 166, 298 N.E.2d 559 (1973). 
65. Id. at 168, 298 N .E.2d at 562. 
66. 116 U.S. 517 (1886). 
67. Id. at 526. 
68. Id. at 527 (emphasis not in original). 
69. 417 U.S. at 67. 
70. 337 U.S. 154 (1949). 
71. 417 U.S. at 69. 
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Trust Territories 
Porter v. United States, 496 F.2d 583 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
In an action by 16 named shareholders of a sea transportation com-
pany against the United States, plaintiffs sought to recover damages for 
an alleged breach of contract, and a taking of property without due 
process of law, by officials serving as administrators for the United 
States Pacific Island Trust Territory. The defendant moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the Court of Claims lacked jurisdiction to 
decide the issue. 
In the Court of Claims' general jurisdictional statute, Congress 
waived the immunity of the United States to claims based upon express 
or implied contracts.72 At issue here is whether the" ... Trust Territory 
government was an agency or instrumentality of the United States act-
ing within the scope of its authority in entering into the disputed agree-
ment and thereby binding defendant as a principal to it."73 
The United States became the administering authority over the 
Pacific Islands Trust Territory under an agreement between the United 
Nations and the United States. The agreement was ratified by the Secu-
rity Council on April 2, 1947, and approved by a joint resolution of 
Congress on July 18, 1947.74 The United States has asserted that it did 
not obtain sovereignty over the area under this agreement. 75 This posi-
tion has been accepted by the courts in a series of cases which held that 
the Trust Territory is either a "foreign country" or an entity which is 
not a "federal agency. "76 
In Best v. United States, 77 the court refused to find a contract 
negotiated by the U.S. Army in occupied Germany binding on the 
United States. The court held that the U.S. Army was an agent of the 
Allied High Commission-an international entity-and not an agent of 
the United States.78 In the present case, the Court of Claims found the 
situation to be analogous to Best and determined that officials acting 
as administrators of the Trust Territory were not agents of the United 
States. Thus, no jurisdiction existed for the breach of contract claim. 
The Court of Claims dismissed the plaintiff's argument of an un-
constitutional taking of property because the plaintiffs had failed to 
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (Supp. II 1972). 
73. 496 F.2d at 587. 
74 . [1947) 61 Stat. 3301, T.I .A.S. No. 1665, 8 U.N.T.S . 189. 
75. 16 DEP'T STATE BULL. 416, 417 (1947). 
76. People of Saipan v. Department of the Interior, 356 F. Supp. 645, 648 (D. Haw. 
1973); Callas v. United States, 253 F.2d 838, 841-42 (2d Cir. 1958); Brunell v. United 
States, 77 F. Supp. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). 
77. 292 F.2d 274, 154 Ct. Cl. 827 (1961). 
78. Fleming v. United States, 352 F.2d 533, 173 Ct. Cl. 426 (1965); Seery v. United 
States, 127 F. Supp. 601, 130 Ct. Cl. 481 (1955); Turney v. United States, 115 F . Supp. 
457, 126 Ct. Cl. 202 (1953). 
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United States v. Lansky, 496 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1974). 
A federal grand jury in Miami was investigating concealment and 
distribution of income of a Las Vegas hotel in connection with possible 
violations of federal income tax laws. Defendant Lansky, an American 
citizen residing in Israel, was subpoenaed to return to the United States 
and testify because the grand jury determined that his testimony was 
necessary to its investigation. The subpoena was issued under the Walsh 
Act79 which governs the issuance of a subpoena on an American national 
who is in a foreign country. The defendant did not appear at the desig-
nated time and he was subsequently indicted for criminal contempt 
under a general contempt statute,80 rather than under the specific en-
forcement section of the Walsh Act, 81 because he "did knowingly, wil-
fully, and contumaciously disobey and resist said lawful subpoena and 
order by refusing to appear before said Grand Jury .... "82 Defendant 
was later expelled from Israel and arrested in the United States for his 
contempt. A jury returned a verdict of guilty and defendant appealed. 
Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion 
for acquittal, and that the Walsh Act provided for the exclusive proce-
dure and penalty for failure to comply with a subpoena issued under it. 
The court of appeals reversed the district court's conviction. 
The court of appeals first upheld the issuance of the subpoena as 
proper. The Walsh Act had been passed by Congress in 1926 in an 
attempt to secure the return to the United States of persons involved 
in the Teapot Dome scandal. The constitutionality of the Act was up-
held by the Supreme Court in Blackmer v. United States. 83 The power 
of Congress to provide, legislatively, for the service of subpoenas on 
American citizens outside the United States derived from the fact that 
"the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to re-
quire the return to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, when-
ever the public interest requires it, and to penalize him in case of re-
fusal. ''84 
The court of appeals then set out the test for considering the defen-
79. 28 u.s.c. § 1783 (1970). 
80. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). 
81. 28 u.s.c. § 1784 (1970). 
82. 496 F.2d at 1067. 
83. 284 u .s. 421 (1932). 
84. Id. at 437. 
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dant's motion for acquittal: whether there was substantial evidence 
upon which a jury might reasonably base a finding that the accused was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 85 The court concluded that the Gov-
ernment's case against Lansky failed for lack of sufficient evidence to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on his familiarity with 
the defendant's physical condition, Lansky's doctor in Israel had stated 
that it was his medical opinion that it would be dangerous to his health 
for the defendant to make the trip to the United States. The Govern-
ment's expert witness, also a doctor, rebutted the testimony of the de-
fendant's doctor to the extent that more tests should have been taken 
by the Israeli doctor before announcing his diagnosis. But he conceded 
that a doctor with similar experience, background, and tests might have 
given the same advice. Therefore, the Government did not prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of wilful and contuma-
cious conduct sufficient to justify a verdict of guilty of contempt. When 
the Government requested on March 9, 1971, that the court fix March 
11 as the return date of the subpoena, it made compliance by the defen-
dant virtually impossible. Furthermore, it failed to make out a case of 
fraud and collusion between the defendant and his doctor. The court 
concluded that the motion for acquittal should have been granted. 
DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS 
Consular Privileges 
United States v. Wilburn, 497 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1974). 
The defendants, clerk of a county district court and county sheriff, 
issued and executed a subpoena which summoned the Mexican Vice-
Consul to testify in a case at trial and to bring with her an application 
by one of the parties to the action for an ordinary tourist card to visit 
Mexico. The record did not disclose at whose instance the present action 
for a preliminary injunction was filed, but the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas immediately entered a temporary restraining 
order and, after a hearing, entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting 
the defendants from issuing any process or subpoenas to the Mexican 
consulate. 
On appeal the United States asserted that Articles 28 through 35 
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations86 provide for complete 
immunity for consular officials, records, and premises from seizure, sub-
poena, or arrest under state process. 87 The defendants argued that in 
85. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 1967). 
86. [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. The Vienna Convention was ratified by 
the Republic of Mexico and the United States prior to the institution of the instant action. 
87. Article 31 specifies that authorities of the host state shall not enter that part of 
the consular premises which is used exclusively for the work of the consular post without 
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these circumstances whatever immunity may exist is specifically quali-
fied under Article 44 of the Convention, which provides that although 
members of a consular post may be called upon to attend as witnesses 
in the course of judicial or administrative proceedings, the members are 
under no obligation to give evidence connected with the exercise of their 
functions. 
The court of appeals reversed the district court and remanded with 
directions to vacate the preliminary injunctive order. The district court 
had failed to give consideration to article 44, since under it the Vice-
Consul was eligible to be called upon to attend as a witness, but would 
have had the right to elect whether to testify or produce the requested 
documents. The issuance of the subpoena was held lawful; it was the 
province of the Vice-Consul, and not the district court, to determine 
whether the application sought by the subpoena was a document relat-
ing to the exercise of consular functions. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Historic Bays 
United States v. State of Alaska, 497 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974). 
The United States sued the State of Alaska to quiet title to the 
lower part of Cook Inlet, located on the Alaska coast, and to enjoin 
Alaska from offering oil and gas leases for sale in the area. The United 
States did not contest Alaska's right to the upper part of Cook Inlet. The 
tract in controversy is located more than three geographic miles seaward 
of the low-water line, the closing lines of rivers and small bays within 
Cook Inlet, and the 24 mile fallback line drawn across the narrows of 
Kalgin Island. The United States argued that the Alaska coastline 
should be at the 24 mile fallback line at Kalgin Island. The State of 
Alaska argued that the coastline should be located at the 47 mile open-
ing of Cook Inlet. The district court found in favor of Alaska and the 
United States appealed.ss The question before the court of appeals was 
whether Cook Inlet was a seabed over which there were "inland waters" 
as denominated in, but not defined by, the Submerged Lands Act of 
1953, s9 entitling Alaska to the natural resources of gas and oil. 
In United States v. California, 90 the Supreme Court adopted the 
definition of inland waters as contained in the Convention on the Terri-
torial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.91 However Cook Inlet fails to meet 
consent. Article 33 provides that the consular archives shall be inviolable at all times 
wherever located. 
88. 352 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alas. 1972). 
89. 43 u.s.c. §§ 1301-43 (1970). 
90. 381 U.S. 139 (1965). 
91. [1964] 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 
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the requirement of having no more than 24 miles between the natural 
entrance points of the bay, as prescribed by Article 7 of the Conven-
tion.92 Nevertheless, in United States v. Louisiana, 93 the Supreme Court 
aiso recognized that whether on not a body of water is inland may 
depend upon historical as well as geographical factors. As to historic 
bays, the court of appeals quoted from the Supreme Court's California 
decision that it is generally agreed that historic title can be claimed only 
when: "[A] coastal nation has traditionally asserted and maintained 
dominion with the acquiescence of foreign nations."94 As to the applica-
bility of international law principles to a domestic controversy, the Su-
preme Court stated in United States v. Louisiana that it would be 
inequitable not to treat a state's claim to historic waters as if it were 
being made by the national sovereign and opposed by another nation. 95 
In Louisiana the Supreme Court further noted with apparent ap-
92. Article 7: 
1. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single 
State. 
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation 
whose penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain 
landlocked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An 
indentation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large 
as, or larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across 
the mouth of that indentation. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying 
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line 
joining the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of 
the presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle 
shall be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across 
the different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they 
were part of the water areas of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance 
points of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn 
between these two low-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be 
considered as internal waters. 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural en-
trance points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-
four miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the 
maximum area of water that is possible with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or 
in any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is ap-
plied. 
93. 394 U.S. 11 (1969). 
94. 381 U.S. at 172. 
95. 394 U.S. at 77-78. 
The Convention was, of course, designed with an eye to affairs between nations 
rather than domestic disputes. But, as we suggested in United States v. 
California, it would be inequitable in adapting the principles of international 
law to the resolution of a domestic controversy, to permit the National Govern-
ment to distort those principles, in the name of its power over foreign relations 
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proval a recent United Nations study recommended by the Interna-
tional Law Commission.96 The Commission concluded that there were 
at least three factors which must be considered in determining whether 
a state has acquired historic title to a maritime area: (1) the exercise of 
authority over the area by the state claiming the historic right; (2) the 
continuity of this exercise of authority; and (3) the attitude of foreign 
states. In light of the above decisions, the court of appeals concluded 
that the district court had correctly adopted this three-pronged test. 
Since the district court correctly applied the law, the only remain-
ing question for review was whether the facts found by the trial court 
were "clearly erroneous."97 The United States succeeded in demonstrat-
ing that the evidence was in conflict and that the question of determin-
ing the ultimate inferences to be drawn was close. But it failed to show 
the findings to be clearly erroneous. Therefore, the court of appeals 
affirmed for the State of Alaska. 
TREATIES 
Taxation 
Compagnie Financiere de Suez v. United States, 492 F.2d 798 (Ct. Cl. 
1974). 
The Suez Canal Company sought a refund of taxes withheld at the 
source of interest and dividends for the period 1952 through 1956. The 
Suez Co. alleged that it was a French, not Egyptian corporation, and 
was entitled to the benefit of the preferential 15 percent maximum 
withholding rate under Article 6A of the Income Tax Convention98 be-
tween the United States and France. The problem before the court was 
to determine whether or not the Suez Co. was in fact a French corpora-
tion, since it was formed pursuant to the permission of the Viceroy of 
Egypt, had its head offices in Egypt, but had its administrative office 
in France. 
and external affairs, by denying any effect to past events. The only fair way to 
apply the Convention's recognition of historic bays to this case, then, is to treat 
the claim of the historic waters as if it were being made by the national sovereign 
and opposed by another nation. To the extent that the United States could rely 
on the state activities advancing such a claim, they are relevant to the determi-
nation of the issue in this case. 
96. Id. at 23-24 n.27. The report was entitled Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, 
Including Historic Bays, [1962) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 1, 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/143 
(1962). 
97 . United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). 
98. The Income Tax Convention between the United States and France was signed 
on July 25, 1939, and October 18, 1946, as modified and supplemented by the Supplemen-
tary Convention signed on June 22, 1956. Article 6A was a product of the 1956 Convention 
made retroactive to January 1, 1952. 
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The court found that the Suez Co. had been deemed to be a French 
corporation for a particular purpose primarily of interest to France, and 
therefore held that as a matter of law the corporation was not entitled 
to recover. The court based its findings on the facts that Egypt had 
demonstrated its sovereign power and authority over the corporation by 
creating it, approving its articles of incorporation, and appointing its 
first chief executive officer. Therefore, the court concluded that the state 
of incorporation was Egypt. Furthermore, the location of corporate ad-
ministrative offices in a particular jurisdiction was not the same as 
being created or organized within that jurisdiction for purposes of estab-
lishing nationality of the corporation. France at most acquiesced in the 
company's granted powers by allowing the company to administer its 
business from within French territory. 
Finally, the court determined that the purpose and intention of the 
Tax Convention between the United States and France was to avoid 
double taxation so as to remove an obstacle to the flow of trade and 
investment between the two countries. However, for the years in ques-
tion, the Suez Co. did not have a "fiscal domicile" or "residence" in 
France for French income tax purposes. The company was never ac-
tually subject to or subjected to tax in France, so there was no possibility 
of double taxation. Therefore, since there was no double taxation obsta-
cle to trade in the case of the Suez Co., there should be no tax benefit 
as provided for in the Convention. The court quoted in support a court 
of appeals decision which held that a treaty, "being a pact between two 
sovereigns, must be construed broadly to accomplish the intent of the 
contracting parties. " 99 Furthermore, the court quoted the Supreme 
Court's decision of Maximov v. United States: "To say that we should 
give a broad and efficacious scope to a treaty does not mean that we 
must sweep within the Convention what are legally and traditionally 
recognized to be . . . taxpayers not clearly within its protections 
•••• "
100 And again, "We cannot ... read the treaty to accord unin-
tended benefits inconsistent with its words and not compellingly indi-
cated by its implications."101 
In addition, the court held that an adverse determination such as 
finding the company not to be French would not violate the rule of 
comity where the only tax authority involved was that of the United 
States, since France had disclaimed its right to tax the company's in-
come. 
99. Citing American Trust Co. v. Smyth, 247 F.2d 149, 152 (9th Cir. 1957). 
100. 373 U.S. 49, 56 (1963). 
101. Id. at 55. 
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